We consider secret sharing schemes in which the dealer is able (after a preprocessing stage) to activate a particular access structure out of a given set and/or to allow the participants to reconstruct di erent secrets (in di erent time instants) by sending them the same broadcast message. In this paper we establish a formal setting to study secret sharing schemes of this kind. The security of the schemes presented is unconditional, since they are not based on any computational assumption. We give bounds on the size of the shares held by participants, on the size of the broadcast message, and on the randomness needed in such schemes.
Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a method of dividing a secret s among a set P of participants in such a way that: if the participants in A P are quali ed to know the secret then by pooling together their information they can reconstruct the secret s; but any set A of participants not quali ed to know s has absolutely no information on the secret. The collection of subsets of participants quali ed to reconstruct the secret is usually referred to as the access structure of the secret sharing scheme.
Secret sharing schemes are useful in any important action that requires the concurrence of several designed people to be initiated, as launching a missile, opening a bank vault or even opening a safety deposit box. Secret sharing schemes are also used in management of cryptographic keys and multi-party secure protocols (see 11] for example). We refer the reader to the excellent survey papers 21] and 24] for a detailed discussion of secret sharing schemes and for a complete bibliography on the argument. Simmons 21] rst pointed out the practical relevance of secret sharing schemes having the feature of being able (after some preprocessing stage) to activate a particular access structure out of a given set and/or to allow the participants to reconstruct di erent secrets (in di erent time instants) simply by sending to all participants the same broadcast message. Harn, Hwang, Laih, and Lee 12] gave an algorithm to construct threshold secret sharing schemes (i.e., characterized by an access structure consisting of all subsets of participants of cardinality not less than some integer k), in which the dealer could enable participants Partially supported by Italian Ministry of University and Research (M.U.R.S.T.) and by National Council for Research (C.N.R.). A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at Crypto '93. to recover di erent secrets in di erent time instants simply by sending the same broadcast message to all of them. However, the authors of 12] assumed that the access structure remained the same in each time instant. Martin 19] presented a technique to realize secret sharing schemes for general access structures in which, by sending a broadcast message to all participants, a new secret is activated and a participant is disenrolled from the scheme. Blakley, Blakley, Chan, and Massey 2] considered the problem of constructing threshold secret sharing schemes with disenrollment capability, but the value of the threshold of the secret sharing schemes is not changed at each disenrollment. Moreover, they gave a lower bound on the size of the shares held by each participant in such schemes.
The problem of evaluating the size of the shares to be given to participants is among the most important problems in the area of secret sharing schemes. Recently, the problem of estimating the amount of random bits necessary to set up the schemes has received considerably attention. The rst problem is strictly related to the security of the schemes, since the security of any system degrades as the amount of secret information increases. The problem of estimating the number of random bits necessary to implement randomized algorithms is receiving considerable interest (see 13] , 17], for example). This is due to the fact that the amount of randomness needed by an algorithm is to be considered a computational resource, analogously to the amount of time and space needed. The quantitative study of the number of random bits needed by secret sharing schemes has been initiated in 6] , where the optimality of several secret sharing schemes according to this measure has been proved. Some other results on this topic can be found in 3] .
In this paper we establish a formal setting to study secret sharing schemes in which di erent access structures and/or di erent secrets can be activated in subsequent time instants simply by sending the same broadcast message to all participants. Our approach is information{theoretic based. The security of the schemes presented in this paper is unconditional, since they are not based on any computational assumption. We rst study the case in which we have di erent access structures and we want to enable one of them to reconstruct a prede ned secret. In this model we show that the size of shares held by any participant and the size of the broadcast message are bounded from below by the size of the secret. We show that these bounds are optimal if one considers separately the problem of bounding the size of the share of the participant and that of the broadcast message (see Theorem 4.5 and Theorem 4.6). Motivated by this result we de ne Ideal Secret Sharing Schemes with Broadcast Message as schemes for which the size of the shares held by participants and the size of the broadcast messages are the same as the size of the secret. We analyze ideal secret sharing schemes with broadcast messages when the family of the access structures that can be activated contains threshold access structures only. In Section 7 we consider the general case in which one wants to activate di erent access structures to recover possibly di erent secrets at subsequent time instants. We give su cient conditions for the existence of a participant whose share size is lower bounded by the sum of the sizes of the secrets. This result generalizes the result of 2] . In Section 8 we analyze the randomness needed to set up secret sharing schemes with broadcast message and we give protocols that are optimal to this respect.
Secret Sharing
A secret sharing scheme permits a secret to be shared among a set P of n participants in such a way that only quali ed subsets of P can recover the secret, but any non-quali ed subset has absolutely no information on the secret. An access structure A is the set of all subsets of P that can recover the secret. In this paper we require that any considered access structure A be monotone, that is if A 2 A and A A 0 P, then A 0 2 A: Let S be the set of secrets, fp S (s)g s2S be a probability distribution on S, and let a secret sharing scheme for secrets in S be xed. For any participant P 2 P, let us denote by K(P) the set of all possible shares given to participant P. Suppose a dealer D wants to share the secret s 2 S among the participants in P (we will assume that D 6 2 P). He does this by giving each participant P 2 P a share from K(P) chosen according to some, non necessarily uniform, probability distribution. Given a set of participants A = fP i 1 ; : : :; P ir g P, where i 1 < i 2 < < i r , denote by K(A) = K(P i 1 ) K(P ir ).
We represent, as in 25], a perfect secret sharing scheme, or simply a secret sharing scheme, by a collection of distribution rules. A distribution rule is a function f : P fDg ! K(P) S which satis es the conditions f(D) 2 S and f(P i ) 2 K(P i ), for i = 1; 2; : : :; n. A distribution rule f represents a possible distribution of shares to the participants, where f(D)
is the secret being shared, and f(P i ) is the share given to P i . If s 2 S is the value of the secret that D wants to share, then D will randomly choose a distribution rule f among all distribution rules having s as the secret, that is f 2 ff 2 F : f(D) = sg, according to some probability distribution, and use f to distribute shares to the participants.
The family of distribution rules F can also be depicted as a matrix M, each row of which corresponds to one distribution rule. One column of M will be indexed by D, and the remaining columns are indexed by the members of P.
Any secret sharing scheme for secrets in S and a probability distribution fp S (s)g s2S naturally induce a probability distribution on K(A), for any A P. Denote such probability distribution by fp K(A) (a)g a2K(A) . Finally, denote by H(S) = ? Following the approach of 14], 16], and 8] we de ne secret sharing schemes using the information measures listed in Appendix A. Therefore, we say that a perfect secret sharing scheme, or simply a secret sharing scheme, is a sharing of the secrets in S among participants in P such that 1: Any subset A P of participants enabled to recover the secret can compute the secret: Formally, for all A 2 A, it holds that H(SjA) = 0. 2: Any subset A P of participants not enabled to recover the secret has no information on the secret value:
Formally, for all A 6 2 A, it holds that H(SjA) = H(S).
Secret Sharing Schemes with Broadcast Message
In this section we de ne secret sharing schemes with broadcast message. Let P = fP 1 ; : : :; P n g be the set of participants. Let A = fA 1 ; : : :; A m g be a family of monotone access structures on the set of participants P and let fp S (s)g s2S be a probability distribution on the set of secrets S. The dealer in the preprocessing phase, knowing fp S (s)g s2S (but not knowing the value of the secret) and A, generates and distributes shares to participants in P. Afterward, in the message-generation phase, the dealer having in input a secret s randomly chosen accordingly to fp S (s)g s2S , the access structures A 1 ; : : :; A m , the shares of participants P 1 ; : : :; P n , and an index i 2 f1; 2; : : :; mg (arbitrarily chosen) computes a message b i and broadcasts it to all participants in P. At the end of the message-generation phase, only the subsets of participants in A i are able to recover s. These phases are described in the following algorithms.
Preprocessing-Algorithm Input: S, fpS(s)gs2S, P = fP1;:::;Png, and A1;: : : ; Am. Output: The shares a1; : : : ; an for participants P1; : : : ; Pn, respectively.
Message-Generation Input: s 2 S, A1;:::;Am, a1; : : : ; an, and i 2 f1;2;:::; mg. Output: The broadcast message bi that enables the access structure Ai.
In this section we consider the case in which we want to enable once for all only one access structure among the family A. The case in which we want to enable di erent access structures at di erent times will be analyzed in Section 7.
We assume that the considered access structures are not trivial, that is, there is always at least a subset of participants who can reconstruct the secret, i.e., A 6 = ;, and that not all possible subsets of participants are able to recover the secret, i.e., ; 6 2 A. If A is an access structure on P, then B 2 A is a minimal authorized subset if A 6 2 A whenever A B. Let A = fA 1 ; : : :; A m j A i 2 P ; 1 i mg be a family of distinct access structures on P. For 1 j m, let P j = X2A 0 j X. We will refer to a participant P 2 P as an essential participant if there exist a set X P and an index i such that X fPg 2 A 0 i . If a participant P in not essential then we can construct a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message giving him nothing as share. In this paper we assume that the set of participants P consists only of essential participants. Moreover, we suppose that the family of access structures A is di erent from the trivial one, i.e., A 6 = fcl(ffP 1 g; : : :; fP n gg)g. Indeed, to realize a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A the dealer hands out to participants nothing as share and, in the Message-Generation phase, he distributes the secret itself as broadcast message.
Let S be the set of secrets, fp S (s)g s2S be a probability distribution on S, and let a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for secrets in S be xed. Analogously to the case of secret sharing scheme without broadcast message, for any participant P 2 P, we denote by K(P) the set of all possible shares given to participant P. Given a set of participants A = fP i 1 ; : : :; P ir g P, where i 1 < i 2 < : : : < i r , denote with K(A) the set K(P i 1 ) K(P ir ). A secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for secrets in S and a probability distribution fp S (s)g s2S induce a probability distribution on K(A), for any A P. Denote such a probability distribution by fp K(A) (a)g a2K(A) . Finally, denote by H(S) the entropy of fp S (s)g s2S and by H(A) the entropy of fp K(A) (a)g a2K(A) , for any A 2 2 P . For any access structure A i 2 A, let us denote by b i a generic broadcast message that enables the access structure A i and by E(B i ) the set of all possible broadcast messages enabling A i . A secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A = fA 1 ; : : :; A m g and a probability distribution fp S (s)g s2S induce, through the two probabilistic algorithms above, a probability distribution on each E(B i ). Denote such a probability distribution by fp E(B i ) ( and therefore the knowledge of x gives no information about the secret. Equivalently, the condition H(SjXB i ) = H(S) means that S and XB i are statistically independent. Moreover, the condition H(SjXB i ) = 0 means that each set of values of the shares and broadcast message in K(X) E(B i ) corresponds to a unique value of the secret. In fact, by de nition, H(SjXB i ) = 0 is equivalent to the fact that for all x 2 K(X) and for all b 2 E(B i ) with p(x; b) > 0 a unique s 2 S exists such that p(sjx b) = 1. For any access structure A i 2 A, let us denote with A B i the family A B i = fX fB i gjX 2 A i g, that is, A B i contains all the sets in the access structure A i that can reconstruct the secret once they know the broadcast message b i that enables A i . Intuitively, in A B i the broadcast message B i \plays" the role of a participant.
As an example let us consider the following situation. Let P = fP 1 ; P 2 ; : : :; P 6 g be the set of participants. Suppose the family A contains three access structures A 1 =cl(ffP 1 ; P 2 g; fP 2 ; P 3 gg), A 2 =cl(ffP 3 ; P 4 gg), and A 3 =cl(ffP 4 ; P 5 g; fP 5 ; P 6 gg). The family of all bases is depicted in Figure 1 . The following algorithms realize a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A when the secret is uniformly chosen in Z q , with U q we denote the uniform probability distribution on Z q .
Preprocessing-Algorithm Input: Zq, Uq, P = fP1;:::;P6g, and A1;A2;A3.
Randomly select r1; r2; r3; r4; r5; r6 2 Zq.
Let a1 = r1 be the share of participant P1, a2 = r2 be the share of participant P2, a3 = (r1; r3) be the share of participant P3, a4 = (r4; r5) be the share of participant P4, a5 = r6 be the share of participant P5, and a6 = r5 be the share of participant P6.
Output: The shares a1; : : : ; a6 for participants P1; : : : ; P6, respectively.
Message-Generation Input: s 2 Zq, A1;A2;A3, a1; : : : ; a6, and i 2 f1;2; 3g.
Let a1 = r1, a2 = r2, a3 = (r1; r3), a4 = (r4; r5), a5 = r6, and a6 = r5. Compute x1 = r1 + r2 mod q, x2 = r3 + r4 mod q, and x3 = r5 + r6 mod q.
Output: The broadcast message bi = s + xi mod q that enables the access structure Ai.
It is easy to see that previous algorithms realize a secret sharing scheme with broadcast for A. 
The Size of Shares
The problem of establishing bounds on the size of the shares to be given to participants in secret sharing schemes is one of the basic problem in the area and has received considerable attention by several researchers. The practical relevance of this issue is based on the following observations: Firstly, the security of any system tends to degrade as the amount of information that must be kept secret, i.e., the shares of the participants, increases. Secondly, if the shares given to participants are too long, the memory requirements for the participants will be too severe and, at the same time, the shares distribution algorithms will become ine cient. Therefore, one important problem is to analyze the amount of information that each participant must keep secret. We will prove a basic bound stating that in any secret sharing scheme with broadcast message the size of the shares, as well as the size of the broadcast message, cannot be less than the size of the secret. 2 Moreover, there are families of access structures for which any corresponding secret sharing scheme with broadcast message must either give to some participant a share of size strictly bigger than the secret size, or the broadcast message has to have size strictly bigger than that of the secret, as we will see in Section 6.
The following lemmas are a generalization to secret sharing schemes with broadcast message of the results proved in 8] for secret sharing schemes with no broadcast message. 1. For any participant P 2 P; it holds that H(P) H(S).
2. For i = 1; 2; : : :; m, it holds that H(B i ) H(S).
If the secrets are uniformly chosen in S, that is H(S) = log jSj, then we can bound from below both the size of the shares distributed to participants and the size of the broadcast messages. Theorem 4.3 Let A = fA 1 ; : : :; A m g be a family of access structures on a set P of participants. If the secret is uniformly chosen in S, then for any secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A the following properties hold:
1. For any P 2 P; it holds that log jK(P)j log jSj. 2. For i = 1; 2; : : :; m, it holds that log jE(B i )j log jSj.
Next lemma implies that the uncertainty on shares of participants in X 6 2 A i cannot be decreased by the knowledge of the secret. 2 As customarily, we measure both the size of the shares and the size of the broadcast message with the logarithm of the size of the sets from which they are taken, that is, by the number of bits necessary to their representation. Next theorems prove that the bounds given in Theorem 4.3 are optimal if considered separately. More precisely, we will prove that for any family of access structures there exist secret sharing schemes with broadcast message such that the size of the shares given to a prede ned participant or the size of the broadcast messages is the same than that of the secret.
The secret sharing schemes with broadcast message presented in this section are all realized by considering uniform distributions on S = Z q , where q 2. Theorem 4.5 Let A = fA 1 ; : : :; A m g be a family of access structures on a set of participants P and let P 2 P be a xed participant. If the secret is uniformly chosen then there exists a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message such that the entropy of the shares given to participant P satis es H(P) = H(S):
Proof: We describe a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message that satis es the property above for a participant P k 2 P.
Preprocessing-Algorithm Input: Zq, Uq, P = fP1;:::;Png, Pk 2 P, and A1;:::;Am. Randomly select r 2 Zq.
Let ak = r be the share of Pk. Message-Generation Input: s 2 S = Zq, A1;::: ; Am, a1; : : : ; an, and i 2 f1;2; : : : ; mg. It is not di cult to see that the previous protocols realize a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message. Indeed, before knowing the broadcast message any subset of participants has no information about the value of the secret; once the dealer distributes the broadcast message b i only the participants in Y 2 A 0 i can recover the secret s. Given In Section 3 we presented a scheme for the family of access structures A = fcl(ffP 1 ; P 2 g; fP 2 ; P 3 gg); cl(ffP 3 ; P 4 gg); cl(ffP 4 ; P 5 g; fP 5 ; P 6 gg)g on the set of participants P = fP 1 ; :::; P 6 g.
In such a scheme participants P 3 and P 4 get a share whose size is twice the size of the secret. By using the algorithms presented in the previous theorem either P 3 or P 4 can have a share of the same size than that of the secret. A possible scheme in which P 3 gets a share whose size is equal to the size of the secret is the following, when it is assumed that the secret is uniformly chosen in Z q , where q 2.
Randomly select r1; r2; : : : ; r9 2 Zq.
Let a1 = r1 be the share of participant P1, a2 = (r2; r3) be the share of participant P2, a3 = r4 be the share of participant P3, a4 = (r5; r6) be the share of participant P4, a5 = (r7; r8) be the share of participant P5, and a6 = r9 be the share of participant P6.
Message-Generation Input: s 2 S = Zq, A1;A2;A3, a1; : : : ; a6, and i 2 f1;2;3g.
Let a1 = r1, a2 = (r2; r3), a3 = r4, a4 = (r5; r6), a5 = (r7; r8), and a6 = r9. Compute b1 = (s + r1 + r2 mod q; s + r3 + r4 mod q), b2 = s + r4 + r5 mod q; and b3 = (r6 + r7 mod q, s + r8 + r9 mod q).
Output: The broadcast message bi enabling the access structure Ai.
It is easy to see that previous algorithms realize a secret sharing scheme with broadcast for A in which the participant P 3 gets a shares whose size is equal to the size of the secret.
Next theorem proves that for any family of access structures there exists a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message such that the size of the broadcast messages is the same than that of the secret. Theorem 4.6 Let A = fA 1 ; : : :; A m g be a family of access structures on a set of participants P. If the secret is uniformly chosen then there exists a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message such that, for all j 2 f1; 2; : : :; mg; the entropy of B j satis es H(B j ) = H(S):
Proof: We describe a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message that satis es the property above. For each j = 1; 2; : : :; m, let j be a secret sharing scheme for the access structure A j for secrets chosen in Z q . Let xi be secret corresponding to the shares yi;1; yi;2; : : : ; yi;n in the scheme i. Let bi = s + xi mod q.
Output: The broadcast message bi that enables the access structures Ai.
It is not di cult to see that the previous protocols realize a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message. Moreover, in the previous protocols we have that H(B j ) = H(S); where j = 1; 2; : : :; m.
Ideal Schemes
In the previous section we have seen that for any family of access structures A either the share given to a participant in P, or the broadcast messages can be of the same dimension than that of the secret. In this section we give a su cient condition for which there exists a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for a family of access structures A = fA 1 ; : : :; A m g such that for any P 2 P and for any i 2 f1; 2; : : :; mg, it holds that H(P) = H(B i ) = H(S). That is, we consider schemes in which both the broadcast messages and the shares of participants have the same dimension than that of the secret. We will use the following lemma that is a slight extension of Theorem 4.1 proved in 8], we omit the proof since it is completely similar to that given in 8].
Lemma 5.1 Let be A; B; C; D; F; S six random variables such that
In analogy with secret sharing schemes without broadcast message 7], we de ne ideal 3 secret sharing schemes with broadcast message as follows.
De nition 5.2 Let A = fA 1 ; : : :; A m g be a family of access structures on a set P of participants. A secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A is said ideal if for any P 2 P and for any i 2 f1; 2; : : :; mg, we have H(P) = H(B i ) = H(S).
We rst consider the simple case A = fA 1 g. Theorem 5.3 Assume that the secret is uniformly chosen in S = Z q , q 2. An ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A = fA 1 g, where S = Z q , exists if and only if there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme for the access structure A 1 , where S = Z q . Proof: Suppose that there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A. Given a non-zero probability broadcast message b 2 E(B 1 ), consider the following scheme b for A 1 when the probability distribution on S is uniform. ideal. Suppose, on the other hand, that an ideal secret sharing scheme 0 , with secrets in Z q , for A 1 exists. Then, use it to distribute among the participants in P a value x randomly chosen in Z q . The broadcast message will be b 1 = s + x mod q. The shares of participants in the scheme for A will be the shares distributed to participant by using the ideal scheme 0 . Clearly this is an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A:
Therefore, the classi cation of ideal secret sharing schemes with no broadcast messages given in 7] applies also to secret sharing schemes with broadcast message.
Recall that, for 1 j m, P j = Let A 1 and A 2 be two access structures on the sets of participants P 1 and P 2 , respectively. If P 1 \P 2 6 = ; we say that the two access structures are connected. Suppose that A 1 and A 2 are not connected. If A l 6 = cl(ffP i g : P i 2 P l g), for l = 1; 2, then there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A = fA 1 ; A 2 g, where S = Z q , if and only if it exists an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for both A 1 = fA 1 g and A 2 = fA 2 g, where S = Z q . If A 1 = cl(ffP i g : P i 2 P 1 g) and A 2 6 = cl(ffP i g : P i 2 P 2 g), The following lemma, due to Brickell and Davenport 7] , holds for any ideal secret sharing scheme. We will use it in the next theorem.
Lemma 5.5 Let A be an access structure. If there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme for A, where S is the set of the secrets, then for any A 2 A 0 , the set K(A) of the possible shares for A is S jAj .
The following corollary is an immediate consequence. Proof: Consider an access structure A on the set of participants P 0 and suppose that there exists an ideal scheme , represented by a family of distribution rules F, when the secrets are randomly chosen in Z q . If we randomly choose the shares of the participants in I = \ X2A 0 X, say the participant P i j 2 I receives the share y i j , then, from Corollary 5.6 there exists at least one distribution rule f 2 F such that f(P i j ) = y i j , for j = 1; 2; : : :; jIj.
The following Preprocessing-Algorithm is based on the previous observation. Hence, we randomly choose the share of any participant belonging to at least two access structures in A (remember that the access structures in A are pairwise compatible), then we distribute the shares to the remaining participants accordingly to the distribution rules that agree on the shares previously distributed. The Message-Generation algorithm is realized accordingly. The algorithms realizing a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A, with secrets in Z q , are the following. Output: The broadcast message bi that enables the access structures Ai.
These algorithms realize an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A. In fact, if P j 6 fP 1 ; : : :; P r g, then the participants in Y 2 A 0 i know b j = s + x j mod q. They can compute x j from their shares and thus get s 2 S. The same arguments apply in case of P j fP 1 ; : : :; P r g. Moreover, both the size of the shares given to participants and the size of the broadcast message are the same than the size of the secret.
Threshold Schemes with Broadcast Message
In this section we analyze the case in which all access structures in A are distinct threshold structures, that is, A = fA (k 1 ;P 1 ) ; A (k 2 ;P 2 ) ; :::; A (kt;Pt) g, where A (k i ;P i ) is the set of all subsets consisting of at least k i participants in P i , i.e., A (k i ;P i ) = fX P i : jXj k i g. In the previous section we gave a su cient condition for which ideal secret sharing schemes with broadcast message exist. Each access structure in the scheme must admit an ideal secret sharing scheme. This condition is necessary but not su cient. Case a. There exists a threshold k i ; i 2 f1; 2g such that k i < r. Case b. Each threshold k i ; i 2 f1; 2g is not less than r. Case a. We assume, w.l.o.g., that k 1 < r. Let P 0 1 = P 1 \ P 2 = fP 1 ; : : :; P r g and P 2 = fP 1 ; : : :; P t 2 g. We further distinguish 2 subcases. Case a.1. k 1 6 = k 2 . Let be k i = minfk 1 ; k 2 g and k j = maxfk 1 ; k 2 g. Consider the ve random variables:
Random variables A; B; C; D; F; S satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 5.1. Indeed, H(SjABF) = 0 as the participants in A together with the participants in F are k j ? 1 k i and so with the broadcast message B i they can recover the secret. Analogously, one can verify that H(SjBCF) = 0 and H(SjACDF) = 0. Moreover, H(SjADF) = H(SjF) = H(S), as the participants in AF are k j ? 1 and they are not su cient to recover the secret with B j . H(SjBF) = H(SjF) = H(S) as the k i ? 1 shares of participants in F are not su cient to get any information on S even after seeing B i . Finally, H(SjACF) = H(SjF) = H(S) as there is no broadcast message in ACF. From Lemma 5.1, we have H(BC) H(BCjF) 3H(SjF) = 3H(S) and there is no ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast messages. Hence, if A 1 and A 2 are not compatible, it is always possible to nd ve random variables F; A; B; C; D such that C = P i , for some P i 2 P 1 \ P 2 and B = B j , where j 2 f1; 2g, that verify the hypothesis of Lemma 5.1. Moreover, our constructions does not depend on the particular P i 2 P 1 \ P 2 . We conclude that, if A 1 and A 2 are not compatible, for all P i 2 P 1 \ P 2 there exist a broadcast message B j ; j = 1; 2 such that H(P i B j ) 3H(S), and, consequently, there is no ideal secret sharing scheme for A. We now consider the case t 3. If there exists a pair of access structures in A that are not compatible then, from the previous discussion there is no ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A. On the other hand, if the t access structures are pairwise compatible, then for Theorem 5.7 there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A.
The previous theorem proves a gap for the dimension of the shares of participants and of the broadcast message. Either there is an ideal scheme (and thus they all have the same size than the secret) or the size of at least one of them is 50% bigger than the secret size. Thus, we have proved that there are families of access structures for which any corresponding secret sharing scheme with broadcast message must either give to some participant a share of size strictly bigger than the secret size, or the broadcast message has to have size strictly bigger than the secret size even though each access structure belonging to these families admits an ideal secret sharing scheme. Next corollary is a consequence of Theorem 6.1. Corollary 6.2 Let A = fA (1;P 1 ) ; : : :; A (1;Pt) g be a family of t 2 distinct access structures.
There exists an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A if and only if P i \ P j = ;; for all i 6 = j: Proof: If P i \ P j = ;; for all i 6 = j; then the access structures A (1;P 1 ) ; : : :; A (1;Pt) are pairwise compatible. Thus, from Theorem 6.1 there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A. On the other hand, suppose that there exist two indices i and j, 1 i < j t such that P i \ P j 6 = ;. Then A (1;P i ) and A (1;P j ) are not compatible, as we suppose that the access structures in A are distinct. Hence, for Theorem 6.1, an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A does not exist and thus, the corollary is proved.
In some cases a better bound on the size of the shares distributed to participants holds. Consider the set of participants P = fX 0 ; X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :; X n g and the access structure M n which is the closure of ffX 1 ; X 2 ; : : :; X n g; fX 0 ; X 1 g; fX 0 ; X 2 g; : : :; fX 0 ; X n?1 gg. In a similar way of Theorem 4.1 in 4] one can easily prove that for any n ? 2 indices i 1 ; i 2 ; : : :; i n?2 2 f1; 2; : : :; n ? 1g, it holds that H(X 0 ) + H(X i 1 ) + : : : + H(X i n?2 ) (2n ? 3)H(S):
(1)
The following theorem holds. F we denote the set of participants whose shares will be revealed, this enables us to use directly the lower bound (1) . By using the same technique employed in Theorem 5.3 on the participants in F (i.e., from a scheme for A we construct a scheme where the shares of participants in F are xed), we lower both the number of participants in the scheme and the threshold of the scheme.
Suppose that k 1 < r, then we have Case 1. If k 1 < k 2 , then let t = minfk 2 ; rg. Let X 0 = B 1 , for i = 1; 2; : : :; t?k 1 +1, let X i = P l i , with P l i 2 P 1 \P 2 , let X t?k 1 +2 = B 2 , nally let F = fP j 1 ; : : :; P j k 1 ?1 g fP`1; : : :; P`k 2 ?t g, where fP j 1 ; : : :; P j k 1 ?1 g P 1 \ P 2 nfP l 1 ; : : :; P l t?k 1 +1 g, and fP`1; : : :; P`k 2 ?t g P 2 nP 1 (this last set there is only when k 2 ? t > 0). It is easy to see that those participants satisfy the hypothesis of lower bound (1).
Case 2. If k 1 = k 2 = k and r = t 2 , then let`= minfk ? 1; t 1 ? rg. If r = t 2 as we suppose that the two access structures are distinct there exists at least participant P j 2 P 1 nP 2 . Let X 0 = B 1 , for i = 1; 2; : : :;`+ 1, let X i = P l i , with P l i 2 P 1 \ P 2 , let X`+ 2 = B 2 , nally let F = fP j 1 ; : : :; P j k?1 g P 1 nfP l 1 ; : : :; P l`+ 1 g such that fP j 1 ; : : :; P j`g P 1 nP 2 . It is easy to see that those participants satisfy the hypothesis of lower bound (1).
Case 3. If k 1 = k 2 = k and r < t 2 , then let`= minfk ? 1; t 2 ? rg. Let X 0 = B 2 , for i = 1; 2; : : :;`+ 1, let X i = P l i , with P l i 2 P 1 \ P 2 , let X`+ 2 = B 1 , nally let F = fP j 1 ; : : :; P j k?1 g P 2 nfP l 1 ; : : :; P l`+ 1 g such that fP j 1 ; : : :; P j`g P 2 nP 1 . It is easy to see that those participants satisfy the hypothesis of lower bound (1).
On the other hand if r k 1 we have Case 1. If k 2 < t 2 , then let t = minfr; t 2 ?k 2 +1g. Let X 0 = B 2 , for i = 1; 2; : : :; t, let X i = P l i , with P l i 2 P 1 \ P 2 , let X t+1 = B 1 , nally let F = fP s 1 ; : : :; P s k 2 ?1 g fP j 1 ; : : :; P j k 1 ?r g, with fP s 1 ; : : :; P s k 2 ?1 g P 2 nfP l 1 ; : : :; P lt g and fP j 1 ; : : :; P j k 1 ?r g P 1 nP 2 . It is easy to see that those participants satisfy the hypothesis of lower bound (1). Case 2. If k 2 = t 2 , then let t = minfr; t 1 ?k 1 +1g. Let X 0 = B 1 , for i = 1; 2; : : :; t, let X i = P l i , with P l i 2 P 1 \ P 2 , let X t+1 = B 2 , nally let F = fP s 1 ; : : :; P s k 1 ?1 g fP j 1 ; : : :; P j k 2 ?r g, with fP s 1 ; : : :; P s k 1 ?1 g P 1 nfP l 1 ; : : :; P lt g and fP j 1 ; : : :; P j k 2 ?r g P 2 nP 1 . It is easy to see that those participants satisfy the hypothesis of lower bound (1). Thus, the theorem holds.
We now analyze the case in which the access structures in A consist of all possible distinct threshold structures on P, that is, A = fA (k;P 0 ) j 1 k jP 0 j n and P 0 Pg: From Theorem 6.1 there is no ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A. A scheme based on a geometric construction (for an overview of geometric constructions for secret sharing schemes, the reader is advised to consult 21], 22], and 23]) is the following.
Let q be a prime power, consider the (n+1)-dimensional vector space over GF(q). Consider the (n+1)-dimensional a ne geometry AG(n+1; q). Let V D be a xed line in AG(n+1; q) and let V I be a hyperplane such that jV D \V I j = 1. The secret will be the point s 2 V D \V I . Uniformly choose 2n points y 1 ; y 2 ; : : :; y 2n 2 V I such that no n + 1 of the 2n + 1 points y 1 ; y 2 ; : : :; y 2n ; s are collinear. For i = 1; 2; : : :; n, give the point y i to the participant P i .
The broadcast message b k;P 0 that enables the access structure A (k;P 0 ) will be equal to b k;P 0 = ( 1 i jP 0 j?k+1 fy n+i g) (
It is easy to see that in the previous scheme for any P in P we have, H(P) = (n + 1)H(S). Moreover, the broadcast message b k;P 0 that enables the access structure A (k;P 0 ) has entropy equal to H(B k;P 0) = (n ? k + 1)(n + 1)H(S). With a slight modi cation of the previous scheme (using techniques described in 24] and 18]), we can obtain a geometric scheme in which H(P) = H(S) and H(B k;P 0) = (n ? k + 1)H(S).
The following algorithms describe a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message such that for all P in P, H(P) = H(S). We suppose that S = GF(q); where q maxf2n; mg + 1 is a prime power.
Threshold Preprocessing-Algorithm Input: S = GF(q), Uq, and P = fP1;:::;Png.
For all Pi 2 P, randomly select ri 2 GF(q) and set ai = ri. Output: The shares a1; : : : ; an for participants P1; : : : ; Pn, respectively.
Threshold Message-Generation Input: s 2 S = GF(q), a1; : : : ; an, k, and P 0 , such that 1 k jP 0 j n Use a (n + 1; 2n) threshold scheme for the secret s to generate the shares y1; : : : ; y2n in such a way that yi = ai, for i = 1; : : : ; n. Notice that we can always construct the threshold scheme (n + 1; 2n) used in the MessageGeneration algorithm. Indeed, we can use the threshold scheme proposed by Shamir 20] .
We have to construct a polynomial f(x) over GF(q) of degree n such that f(i) = y i , for i = 1; 2; : : :; n, and f(0) = s. This can be done by using the Lagrange interpolation. Thus, we set y i = f(i), for i = n + 1; : : :; 2n. The broadcast message b k;P 0 that enables the access structure A (k;P 0 ) has entropy equal to H(B k;P 0) = (n ? k + 1)H(S). Moreover, the entropy of the share of each participant P i 2 P is equal to H(P i ) = H(S): Since each broadcast message b k;P 0 consists of n ? k + 1 values of f(x), every k participants in the threshold structure A (k;P 0 ) know n + 1 values of f(x) and can reconstruct the secret s. But k ? 1, or less, participants are not able to recover the secret. It is clear that the previous algorithm can be easily adapted to handle the case in which only a subset of all threshold structures can be activated by the broadcast message.
Fully Dynamic Secret Sharing Schemes
In previous sections we have analyzed the situation in which we have various access structures and by using a public message we enable one of them to recover the secret. A more interesting situation arises when we want to activate di erent access structures at subsequent times. At time i we want to enable an access structure A (i) j i , chosen in a xed family m i g be families of access structures on a set P of participants. In any fully dynamic secret sharing scheme, for i = 1; 2; : : :; T, the following properties hold:
1. For any P 2 P (i) ; it holds that H(P) H(S (i) ). be families of access structures on P. A strong fully dynamic secret sharing scheme is a fully dynamic secret sharing scheme such that after seeing the new broadcast message, any subset of participants that is not in the new access structure, even knowing all the previous secrets, has no information about new secret:
Formally, for all i = 1; : : :; T, for all j 1 ; : : :; j i , where 1 j` m`, and for all X 6 2 A Hence, any fully dynamic secret sharing scheme can be seen as a strong one.
The following lemma is a generalization to strong fully dynamic secret sharing schemes of Lemma 4.1. We omit the proof since it is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.1. Lemma 7.4 Let A (1) ; : : :; A (T ) be families of access structures on a set P of participants. Let A X i X i+1 , for i = 1; : : :; T ? 1. Then, in any strong fully dynamic secret sharing scheme for A (1) ; : : :; A (T ) the entropy of the shares given to participant P satis es
Proof: Consider the entropy H(P). We 
) + H(PjX 1 B
) (from Lemma 7.4) H(S (1) ) + H(PjX 2 B
) (from (5), Appendix A) = H(S (1) ) + H(S (2) ) + H(PjX 2 B
S (2) ) (from Lemma 7.4) . . . We point out that Theorem 7.5 does not hold if we assume fully dynamic secret sharing schemes instead of strong fully dynamic secret sharing schemes.
H(S
As an example consider the following situation. Let A (1) = fA (1) 1 g and A (2) = fA (2) 1 g be two families of access structures on the set of participants P = fP 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 g, where A to reconstruct the secret s (1) and at time 2 the dealer enables A (2) 1 to reconstruct the secret s (2) . The following algorithms describe a fully dynamic secret sharing scheme for A (1) and A (2) : Preprocessing-Algorithm Input: Zq, Uq, P = fP1;P2; P3g and A (1) , A (2) . For i = 1; 2; 3, randomly select ri 2 Zq and set ai = ri to be the share of Pi 2 P. Output: The shares a1; a2; a3 for participants P1; P2; P3, respectively.
Message-Generation Input: s (1) ; s (2) 2 Zq, A (1) , A (2) , and a1; a2; a3. The scheme above realizes a fully dynamic secret sharing scheme, but it is not a strong fully dynamic secret sharing scheme. In fact, it is easy to see that H(S (2) The scheme above satis es the remaining hypothesis of Theorem 7.5 by setting P = P 2 , X 1 = fP 1 g and X 2 = fP 1 ; P 3 g. On the other hand, we have H(P 2 ) = H(S (1) ) = H(S (2) ), thus H(P 2 ) < H(S (1) ) + H(S (2) ):
The following corollaries to Theorem 7.5 hold.
Corollary 7.6 Let P be a set of participants and let A (1) ; : : :; A (T ) be families of access structures on P such that A (k i ;P i ) 2 A (i) , for i = 1; 2; : : :; T. If k 1 k 2 k T and P 1 P 2 P T , then the entropy of the share given to any participant P 2 P 1 satis es
Proof: Suppose that at time i the dealer enables the access structure A (k i ;P i ) to recover the i-th secret. Let P be a participant in P 1 . Construct the sets X 1 ; : : :; X T as follows. Let the set X 1 be equal to X 1 = fP i 1 ; : : :; P i k 1 ?1 g, where each P it , with t = 1; 2; : : :; k 1 ? 1, belongs to P 1 nfPg. For j = 2; 3; : : :; T, if k j = k j?1 then the set X j will be equal to X j?1 , otherwise the set X j will be equal to X j = X j?1 fP i k j?1 +1 ; : : :; P i k j g, where each P it , with t = k j?1 + 1; : : :; k j , belongs to P j n(fPg X j?1 ). It is easy to see that the participants P and the sets X 1 ; : : :; X T satis es the hypothesis of Theorem 7.5, thus the corollary is proved.
Corollary 7.7 Let P be a set of n participants and let k and T be positive integers, with 1 k n and T n ? k. Let A 
Randomness in Secret Sharing Schemes with Broadcast
Randomness plays an important role in several areas of theoretical computer science, most notably algorithm design, complexity and cryptography. Since random bits are a natural computational resource, the amount of randomness used in computation is an important issue in many applications. Therefore, considerable e ort has been devoted both to reduce the number of random bits used by probabilistic algorithms (see for instance 13] ) and to analyze the amount of randomness required in order to achieve a given performance 17]. The Shannon entropy of the random source generating the random bits represents the most general and natural measure of randomness.
In this section we de ne the dealer's randomness for secret sharing schemes with broadcast message. We present a lower bound on the dealer's randomness R(A) of any distribution protocol realizing a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for a given family of access structures A = fA 1 ; : : :; A m g.
To formally de ne the dealer's randomness we use the Shannon entropy of the random variables generating the secret and the shares. Given a probability distribution P = (p 1 ; : : :; p n ), the Shannon entropy of P is H(P) = ? P n i=1 p i log p i . The entropy is strictly related to the measure of randomness introduced by Knuth and Yao 15] . Let A be an algorithm that generates the probability distribution P = (p 1 ; : : :; p n ), using only independent and unbiased random bits in inputs. Denote by T(A) the average number of random bits used by the algorithm A and let T(P) = min A T(A). Knuth H(P) T(P) < H(P) + 2:
Thus, the entropy of a random source is very close to the average number of independent unbiased random bits necessary to simulate the source.
To analyze the randomness needed by the dealer we de ne the dealer's randomness of a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message , when the probability distribution on the set of secrets S is S , as R(A; S ; ) = H(P 1 : : :P n B 1 : : :B m jS): The value R(A; S ; ) represents a lower bound on the amount of randomness required by the dealer to set up the scheme when using the scheme and when S is the probability distribution on the secret. Notice that R(A; S ; ) depends also on since the probability that participants receive given shares depends both on fp S (s)g s2S and .
De nition 8.2 Let A = fA 1 ; : : :; A m g be a family of access structures on a set P = fP 1 ; : : :; P n g of participants. The dealer's randomness R(A) of A is de ned as R(A) = inf Q;T
R(A; S ; )
where Q is the space of all non-trivial probability distributions S on the set of secrets S and T is the space of all secret sharing schemes with broadcast message for the family of access structures A.
The dealer's randomness represents the minimum amount possible of randomness for a given family A of access structures. The de nition of independent sequence given in 6] can be easily modi ed to handle the more general case of secret sharing schemes with broadcast message as follows.
For threshold schemes with broadcast message the following bound holds. Corollary 8.6 Let A = fA (k 1 ;P 1 ) ; : : :; A (km;Pm) g be a family of threshold access structures on a set P = fP 1 ; : : :; P n g of participants. Then, the dealer's randomness R(A) satis es R(A) maxfk 1 ; : : :; k m gH(S):
In Section 6 we presented a protocol to realize secret sharing schemes with broadcast message for the access structures in A consisting of all possible distinct threshold structures on P. The previous corollary proves that the protocol is optimal with respect to the randomness used to construct such schemes when both the uniform probability distribution on the set S of the secret is assumed and q = 2 t . Recall that in such a case H(S) = t.
We can improve on the lower bound provided by Corollary 8.6 when A consists of two threshold access structures. Theorem 8.7 Let A = fA (k 1 ;P 1 ) ; A (k 2 ;P 2 ) g be a family of two threshold access structures on a set P = fP 1 ; : : :; P n g of participants. Let t i = jP i j; where i = 1; 2, and r = jP 1 1 . Then, the sequence of participants P i 1 ; : : :; P i k 1 +k 2 , where P i 1 ; : : :; P i k 1 2 P 1 nP 2 and P i k 1 +1 : : :P i k 1 +k 2 2 P 2 , is an independent sequence. On the other hand, suppose that t i ? r < k i ; for i = 1; 2: Then, R(A) maxfk 2 + t 1 ? r; k 1 + t 2 ? rgH(S): In fact, if k 2 + t 1 ? r k 1 + t 2 ? r then the sequence of participants P i 1 ; : : :; P i k 2 +t 1 ?r ; where P i 1 ; : : :; P it 1 ?r 2 P 1 nP 2 , P i t 1 ?r+1 ; : : :; P i t 1 +k 2 ?t 2 2 P 1 \ P 2 and P i t 1 +k 2 ?t 2 +1 ; : : :; P i k 2 +t 1 ?r 2 P 2 nP 1 ; is an independent sequence. Else if k 1 + t 2 ? r > k 2 +t 1 ?r then the sequence of participants P i 1 ; : : :; P i k 1 +t 2 ?r where P i 1 ; : : :; P it 2 ?r 2 P 2 nP 1 , P i t 2 ?r+1 ; : : :; P i t 2 +k 1 ?t 1 2 P 1 \ P 2 and P i t 2 +k 1 ?t 1 +1 ; : : :; P i k 1 +t 2 ?r 2 P 1 nP 2 ; is an independent sequence.
It is easy to see that maxfk 2 + t 1 ? r; k 1 + t 2 ? rg maxfk 1 ; k 2 g and so above theorem improves on Corollary 8.6.
Since the conditional mutual information is always non negative we get H(XjZ 1 ; : : :; Z n ) H(XjZ 1 ; : : :; Z n Y ): (5) From (3) and (5) one easily gets that for any sets Y; X 1 ; : : :; X n and a joint probability distribution on their cartesian product it holds that n X i=1 H(X i jY ) H(X 1 X 2 : : :X n jY ): (6) 
